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ABSTRACT
Three years ago, after the Kosovo war and the launch of the Stability Pact for South East
Europe, there was a spasm of interest in the idea of a stability pact for the Caucasus. However
nothing came of this, since neither the region’s leaders nor the international community were
willing or able to do anything of substance, although a comprehensive proposal had been
published by CEPS as a ‘track 2’ initiative. As a result, the de facto secessions of Abkhazia
and Nagorno Karabakh have become more deeply entrenched, but only with the protection of
Russia and Armenia, respectively, with which these entities have become increasingly
integrated de facto. Since conventional diplomacy in the Caucasus under UN or OSCE
auspices has failed to deliver solutions over a whole decade, we take a wider look here at the
kind of solutions that may emerge for these so-called frozen conflicts of the European
periphery. New developments external to the region are coming from the EU and the US: the
widening of the Europeanisation process on the one hand, and the ‘democratic imperialism’ or
Pax Americana coming out of Washington since 11 September 2001 and now the Iraq war.
We explore below how these developments may affect the prospects for the Caucasus.
                                                
* The author is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This is a
revised version of a paper presented initially at a conference of the Heinrich Boell Foundation, Berlin, “The
South Caucasus – a Challenge for Europe”, 6-8 May 2003. A revised version was presented at the international
conference of the Ad Hoc Commission on Abkhazia Issues of the Georgian Parliament on “New Models for
Conflict Resolution and perspectives of their Implementation in Abkhazia”, Tbilisi, 28-29 May 2003. Further
revisions have been made following a visit to Abkhazia in early June.1
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1.  A stability pact for the Caucasus?
Soon after the Kosovo war in 1999, which gave birth to the Balkan Stability Pact, there was a
spasm of interest in the idea of a stability pact for the Caucasus as a solution to the frozen
conflicts of Nagorno Karabakh (NK), Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
No less than four presidents from the region (Demirel, Aliev, Kocharian and Shevarnadze)
spoke in favour at an OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, which gave this
organisation an opening to do something important.
Nevertheless, none of these leaders, nor the OSCE as an institution made any substantive
proposals. The external powers – the EU, Russia and the US – responded with a deafening
silence.
Only at the ‘track 2’ level of policy research institutes were ideas forthcoming, notably from
CEPS which published a detailed proposal in May 2002, for a stability pact for the Caucasus.
1
This was revised by October 2002 after a series of consultations with the four presidents, the
leadership of the non-recognised secessionist entities and independent experts in the region.
2
CEPS was proposing a comprehensive solution to the conflicts and a design for a new
regional order. It was called ‘stability pact’ for want of a better name. It was not copying the
Balkan Stability Pact precisely, except that both cases saw, or would see, the international
community promoting comprehensive systemic solutions for complex regions with multiple
ethnic conflicts or tensions.
More specifically the proposed Caucasus Stability Pact would have had the following
features:
-  federative solutions to the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Nagorno Karabakh conflicts,
built into ‘common state’ constitutions for Georgia and Azerbaijan;
-  initiation of a South Caucasus Community regional organisation, which could also be a
forum for autonomous substate entities (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and
maybe  Adjaria and  Nakichevan too) to have an asymmetric presence – where their
competences were concerned – alongside the three international states;
-  a regional security order established under the auspices of the OSCE, providing both
peacekeeping and monitoring functions as well as security guarantees;
-  an agreement between the EU and Russia to cooperate over policies towards the Caucasus
and to join together, for the optimal development of Black Sea regional cooperation,
through the BSEC organisation.
The overall idea was to introduce a step change in perspectives for the whole of the region,
and to alter assessments by political, business and civil society leaders of their interests in
solving the conflicts, lifting the frontier blockades (of Armenia and Abkhazia) and getting
onto a new development path.
                                                
1 S. Celac, M. Emerson and N. Tocci (2002), A Stability Pact for the Caucasus, CEPS Brussels.
2 M. Emerson, N. Tocci and E. Prokhorova (2001), “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus in Theory and Practice – a
Supplementary Note”, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol 1. No. 3.MICHAEL EMERSON
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But nothing was done at the official level and the idea faded into the background. Meanwhile
the same old diplomacy continued year after year. The OSCE Minsk group (and notably the
co-chairs France, Russia and the US) carried on with their secret meetings over Nagorno
Karabakh with no results. The UN Secretary General’s ‘Friends of Georgia’ group (France,
Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) also struggled to agree on a proposal for a federal
constitution to settle the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict, without result.
2.  Taxonomy of multi-tier solutions
Solutions have been elusive, yet there has to be some future. The idea of ‘frozen conflicts’
cannot go on for ever. If a conflict is ‘frozen’ for ten years, it hardly qualifies as a conflict any
more. It must have given way to some apparently durable regime, that the international
community may still not want to recognise, but which has come to exist de facto.
Politicians and diplomats generally try to keep the discussions to the choice between two
basic variants:
-  mutually agreed secession and internationally recognised, independent statehood,
-  when there is no agreement between the two parties, the international community does not
recognise secession nor independence and looks for a federative solution within a single
state under international law.
Nevertheless, real world solutions turn out to be far more complex and varied, especially in
the European neighbourhood, where there is a proliferation of multi-tier governance systems.
A taxonomy is offered in Box 1, listing options or elements for composite solutions for the
dyadic, ethno-secessionist conflicts such as are seen not only in the Caucasus but also
elsewhere in south-east Europe (the Balkans, Moldova and Cyprus).
Box 1. Taxonomy of solutions to dyadic, ethno-secessionist conflicts
One tier – secession and/or unitary state(s)
1.  Secession denied, unitary state prevails
2.  Secession and independence, recognised internationally
3.  De facto secession and independence, non-recognised
Two tier – with federative solutions
4.  Dyadic federation (one state in international law, decentralised powers)
5.  Dyadic confederation (two states in international law, some common policies)
6.  Common state (one state in international law, some common policies)
Three tier – with regional cooperation
7.  Regional community of two or more states (and substate entities)
Four tier – with role of supranational or external powers
8.  Multilateral, e.g. OSCE/UN/Council of Europe
9.  ‘Europeanisation’/‘Russification’/‘Pax Americana’
(for overarching protection/association/integration/annexation)
10. Coalition/consortium/condominion, e.g. the EU and Russia, or troika of the EU-RUS-USCAUCASUS REVISITED
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Secession types. Secession and independence will be recognised internationally when the
parties are in agreement, such as happened with the breakup of Czechoslovakia, or at least
when the process is not seriously contested as with the primary breakup of the Soviet Union.
Disputed secessions may lead to de facto secession and independence, lacking international
recognition, as seen in Kosovo,  Transniestria, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh and Northern
Cyprus. However in such cases the seceding party may be perceived as a threat to others and
may not be able to defend itself. Therefore the role of a third party may be crucial in some
form or other – protectorate, association, integration or annexation. These variants call for
more precise definitions, to which we return later (Box 2).
Federative models. Attempts to negotiate stand-alone federative solutions have proved
popular with the international community, yet often unsuccessful for the parties concerned.
Typically a negotiation between the two principal parties gets stuck between one side,
normally the majority party, insisting on a federation (one state in international law with a
vertical power structure) and the other side, normally the minority party, seeking
confederation (two states in international law with a horizontal power structure).
Attempts to find a compromise have sometimes used the term ‘common state’, although it has
no commonly accepted definition. We understand this term to mean a system where (despite
having only one state in international law) the functional structure of government is more like
a confederation with selected common policies. The weakness of this kind of scheme is that
the functions and powers of the common state may not be substantial enough to prevent
centrifugal forces from predominating it, and lead to the breakup of the common state. This is
why it may need to be combined with a tier of supranational or external power, to hold it
together. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the model is being attempted with the
prospect of EU integration as the umbrella, and it may yet collapse. The UN Annan plan for
Cyprus was another example that got stalled again in March of this year, but which might still
come about, with full EU membership. Belgium within the EU is the mature case of a thin
dyadic federal structure, made viable because of its deep integration with the EU tier of
governance. The OSCE proposed in 1998 a very thin common state for Azerbaijan and
Nagorno Karabkah (see Annex B), which failed to win agreement, but the text is worth noting
a specimen in the collection of common state ideas.
Regional models. Also popular with the international community is the idea that conflictual
regions should not only settle their differences with federative structures, but also set up
structures to organise regional cooperation. Natural geographic regions such as the Caucasus
and the Balkans (or Baltic Sea, Black Sea, etc.) always have a potentially useful agenda for
cooperation over such matters as transport, energy and communications networks, policies for
regional free trade and the movement of persons, environmental problems, combating cross-
border crime, etc. It is also generally hoped that regional cooperation will create sufficient
common interests to displace or dominate interests in conflict. But it is also observed that the
incentives for regional cooperation in chronically conflictual regions tend not to be perceived
as strong enough to tip the balance decisively from ‘war to peace’.
Such regional structures may also provide opportunities for substate entities to participate
with their own voices in intra-regional relations. To a degree, this would mean asymmetric
relations between states recognised in international law and substate entities. This would be
an ordered asymmetric system, for which Northern Ireland provides some illustrative ideas.
3
                                                
3  The British province is able to conduct some of its competences in direct cooperation with the Republic of
Ireland, apparently without the British government having lost its ‘territorial integrity’. In addition there is aMICHAEL EMERSON
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Supranational or external power. We are thus observing circumstances in which there is a
role for supranational or external powers – to overarch both common state and regional
cooperation arrangements. Both of these have their value but may not be robust enough
structures to survive in a post-conflict environment among the weak or failed states of the
European south-eastern periphery. We may reflect on what the role of the overarching power
might consist of, considering for the European periphery a matrix of the four types of
relationship already mentioned (protection, association, integration and annexation – see Box
2) and several possible supranational or external actors or groupings (the EU, Russia, the US,
the multilateral organisations and various coalition/consortium/condominion possibilities).
As a contemporary example, Bosnia lives under an international protectorate regime, but this
is combined with recognised independence and statehood. Kosovo is another international
protectorate, whose de facto secession is not recognised internationally. Association
agreements between the EU and its neighbours are numerous – including the pre-accession
cases, the Euro-Med associates, as well as the European Economic Area (e.g. Norway) as the
deepest association model. Integration is seen in the process of accession to the EU. Northern
Cyprus has been a Turkish protectorate for decades. Formal annexation by Turkey was long
discussed as a political option, but was deferred because of Turkey’s European ambitions. The
Marshall Islands in the Pacific have also provided an interesting model, graduating in 1986
after four decades of UN trusteeship administered by the US into a ‘free associated state’,
which is dependent on the US for its currency, defence and sponsorship in international
organisations (see more below).
Box 2. Protectorates, association, integration and annexation
o  Protectorate: an external power keeps the peace with the aid of military or police forces as
necessary, and may also exercise powers of civil administration. The external power may be
invited or uninvited, which leads to different degrees of democratic legitimacy.
o  Association: a self-governing entity adopts some or even many of the policies and laws of an
external power, usually its much bigger neighbour, but without becoming part of the political
structure of the neighbour. This regime derives its legitimacy from being voluntarily sought or
accepted.
o  Integration: an entity voluntarily becomes a full part of the economic and political structures and
jurisdiction of the formerly ‘external’ power.
o  Annexation: an integration that occurs through the use of force, or without the consent of the
parties directly concerned, nor the legitimising agreement of the international community.
As for the three big powers – the EU, Russia and the US (in alphabetical order) – they all
have different kinds of interests in the Caucasus. In general, these three powers represent
different paradigms of international relations, and certainly with respect to the European
periphery, which presumably is why they have not succeeded in creating an effective
international role in the region. Moreover their differences escalated dramatically during the
recent Iraq war, and we have to discuss below the prospects for them to come together
                                                                                                                                                        
Council of the British Isles at which two sovereign states (Ireland and the UK) sit together with three substates
(Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales) along with the Channel Islands and the Ile of Man. The positions of these
islands defy short constitutional definitions, proving only that all kinds of compromises can be made over
statehood and sovereignty if one really wants to find solutions: these islands are not part of the UK nor the EU,
but are subject to much UK and EU jurisdiction, with the UK taking care of their external relations and the
people of the islands having British passports (which are issued by the authorities of the islands and visibly have
both the island and UK identity appearing on the face of the passport).CAUCASUS REVISITED
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cooperatively in the Caucasus in the future. Briefly, the EU leads the process of
‘Europeanisation’ of the wider Europe, but it is not yet clear where the boundaries of the
wider Europe lie. Russia aims at re-establishing ‘its near-abroad’ as a sphere of influence –
Russification. The US makes its presence felt as executor of a Pax Americana. These three
paradigms call for more precise definitions.
Europeanisation. The distinction is made between accession to EU membership (a formal
political and legal act) and Europeanisation, which is a wider process of political, economic
and societal transformation. Europeanisation works through three types of mechanism: a) the
precise legal obligations that come from preparing for accession to the EU and acceding to the
Council of Europe (which effectively serves as the EU’s human rights training school and
enforcement agency); b) a change in the domestic rules of the game in politics and business,
altering the strategic position of domestic actors; and c) a change in the beliefs, expectations
and identity of the individual (regional/ethnic, national, European). Synthesising these
different mechanisms of law, economics, politics and sociology is the vital (yet subjective)
will of the individual, political parties and interest groups in order to accept or even push for
the adoption of European norms of business and politics.
Europeanisation is still a thin and remote part of the mind-set of the peoples and the leaders of
the Caucasus. Nevertheless it could become increasingly relevant for three reasons. First,
Europeanisation has a real record of achievement in the transformation of the formerly fascist
dictatorships of southern Europe (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and now of the formerly
communist regimes of central Europe acceding to the EU.
4  Secondly, the process now
extends into south-eastern Europe in the Balkans
5 and Turkey, to the point that this wider
Europe, of states with recognised EU accession prospects, now border the Black Sea and the
Caucasus. Thirdly, the three south Caucasus states are all members of the Council of Europe.
They have accordingly subscribed in principle and in international law to the political norms
of modern Europe, and are therefore already on a preliminary course of  Europeanisation. At
this point, there is an obviously desirable opening for a combined EU-Turkish initiative,
wherein Turkey would extend its own  Europeanisation process and ideology through its
Caucasus diplomacy. The EU and Turkey together could press more actively for a civilised
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh question, including normalisation of Turkish-Armenian
relations. In fact signs of new thinking are emerging in Ankara, as we show below. The
attempted blockade of Armenia by Turkey does not work. It is just a component of the
Caucasian structures of corrupt inefficiency and low living standards.
Russification. Russia has had its Tsarist and then Soviet imperial presence in the Caucasus for
250 years. Russia was invited by Georgia into the region as a peacekeeper and guarantor in
the 18th century. The Soviet period came and went. Today Russian policy towards the
Caucasus seems guided by a general objective of maximising influence within the constraints
of the post-Soviet geopolitical reality. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was a
                                                
4 For a presentation of the concepts and application to southern Europe see: K. Featherstone and G.  Kazamias
(eds) (2001), Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery, London: Frank Cass.
5 For a Bosnian view of Europeanisation a paper by former foreign minister Jadranko Prlic is quite clear: “The
EU leverage is (the) identification of the EU in the (Balkan) region as an area with security, jobs, a decent and
rising standard of living, the rule of law upheld by accountable, democratic, clean public institutions, and a
system of minorities protected by law, not by the carving out of territories….  Without recognition that the future
of the region is in the EU, there is no chance for the implementation of a coherent plan. Not only the political
elite, military officers, intelligentsia, but also the majority of the public should share this opinion. For the first
time all the countries from the region, even the participants in the recently ended conflict, are attempting to join
the European main stream”.  Extracted from Prlic, J. (2003), Milestones towards a reunited Europe – Agenda for
integration of south-eastern Europe into the European Union, working paper, University of Mostar, March.MICHAEL EMERSON
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first attempt to reconstruct links with the former Soviet republics through a Russian-led
community modelled on the EU, but this hardly worked at all. Giving up on the dysfunctional
CIS, Russia (under President Putin) has concentrated on core groups, including the Collective
Security Treaty Organisation, with Armenia as the only member from the Caucasus, and the
Euro-Asian Economic Area, in which Armenia is the only observer from the Caucasus so far.
Russian policy towards Georgia is particularly complicated, given the Abkhazia, South
Ossetia and Pankisi gorge situations – the latter seeing a spillover of the Chechnyan war – to
which we will return. Russia’s policies towards the Caucasus as a whole seem to be an uneasy
mix of ideas, blending some old Soviet reflexes (e.g. as seen in some acts that pressurise
Georgia) with the contemporary rules of the international community for relations between
independent states. Indeed Russia’s own transition has been influenced by the ‘Washington
consensus’ (see below) and a degree of Europeanisation. Its leadership has to struggle to
impose coherence on the workings of its bureaucracy that may be trying to play by
international and European rules in some theatres of operation, while at the same time trying
to exert Realpolitik influence in others, such as the Caucasus.   
Pax Americana. Until 11 September 2001, US policy towards the Caucasus sought to support
the newly independent states through the post-communist transition, with the ideology and
policy prescriptions of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ (norms of market liberalism and
macroeconomic stability of the IMF and World Bank, democratic governance, etc.). Up to this
point the process is quite compatible with Europeanisation. But Washington strategists under
Clinton foresaw the area in terms of the ‘great game’ paradigm, of competing with Russia for
influence in Central Asia and the Caspian basin, for which the promotion of the Baku-Ceyhan
oil pipeline became the most tangible project.
Since 11 September 2001, US priorities have been transformed, and are now seen through the
prism of the war against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and the threat of arms of mass
destruction falling into the hands of terrorists (possibly via the intermediation of criminal
gangs in lawless states). The new priorities in US doctrine entail a greater willingness to
deploy the military, special forces and the CIA, both unilaterally and pre-emptively. The chief
ideologues in the Bush administration have set out their agenda for transforming the wider
Middle East region, including any nearby places such as the Caucasus that might link together
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and the chronic criminality of weak or failed states. It is
hoped that the Iraq war and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime will deliver a
demonstrative effect on other states in the region. If the message does not get through, then
the doctrine of pre-emptive unilateralism stands, as and when needed.
Multilateral organisations. Both the UN and the OSCE have experiences of mediation and
monitoring cease-fire or peacekeeping situations in the Caucasus, and have representative
offices there. With regard to mediation, both are working essentially through core groups of
large powers (the UN ‘Friends of Georgia’, the OSCE Minsk group). Elsewhere the UN has
had a more central role in mediation (Cyprus), and has been entrusted with major post-conflict
operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan). The OSCE has not yet extended beyond softer roles,
including monitoring. Neither the UN nor the OSCE have been mandated to enforce
solutions. The Council of Europe has a significant role in the human rights and democracy
domains, but is still a marginal actor. NATO becomes involved in the security domain
through the Partnership for Peace programme, but again, only marginally.
Coalition/consortium/condominion.  The unmanageability of international organisations
governed by consensus rules and having large numbers of member states leads to situations
where the formal multilateral framework is little more than window dressing, if indeed it
manages to retain a role at all (e.g. the case of the US-UK coalition over Iraq). At present, theCAUCASUS REVISITED
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US certainly looks to the formation of ad hoc coalitions of willing partners as the default
mode and has little patience for protracted multilateral diplomacy. For the Caucasus, one can
imagine all combinations of coalition: EU-US as the traditional Western allies, Russia-US as
the new anti-terrorist alliance, EU-Russia as the two big European players (with overlapping
near-abroads). There is no shortage of fora where all three together try in principle to work
together. We discuss later how far these forms of bilateral or trilateral cooperation have been
set back by the recent Iraq affair.
Eligible external players in the Caucasus have long included the other two big neighbours,
Turkey and Iran. Turkey was itself one of the promoters of the Caucasus Stability Pact in
1999/2000. Iran has also recently raised its voice, with the visit of its foreign minister to the
three south Caucasus states in May 2003, following a previous tour of the same kind in July
2001. At least the diplomatic discourse reaches the stage of simple arithmetic. Iran would like
to see a 3+3 process, with Russia, Turkey and Iran to join the South Caucasus three. Others
have suggested 3+3+2, to bring in the distant EU and US powers. Subtleties at this stage
include whether the second three is composed of the EU/Russia/US, or Russia/Turkey/Iran;
then whether the two are either the EU/US or Turkey/Iran.
3.  The status quo
What has actually happened in these lands of frozen conflicts? To say ‘nothing’ would not be
far from the truth, but that would be excessively brief. While the conflicts have remained
unresolved, they have not been frozen.
Abkhazia. In de facto secession since the war of 1992-93, Abkhazia’s frontier with Georgia
has been virtually closed, except for pedestrian movements of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in and out to visit their properties in the southern Gali district. Tiblisi has no effective
power in Abkhazia. It has become a de facto protectorate of Russia, whose peacekeeping
forces on the Georgian frontier operate with a thin veneer of international recognition from
the UN (with an unarmed monitoring presence) and the CIS (the label for the armed
peacekeeping force, which is exclusively Russian). Recently, Abkhazia has become
increasingly associated with Russia economically and integrated politically, but without
formal diplomatic recognition by Russia or anyone else. Their currency is the Russian rouble
and the population is in the course of acquiring Russian citizenship and passports, upon the
expiry of the old USSR passports last year.
6 The Abkhazia-Russian frontier is open for road
transport and the Sochi-Sukhumi railway re-opened in recent months. Russia keeps border
controls there, but the frontier is not blockaded as under sanctions. Integration with Russia
therefore deepens, given territorial contiguity and an open frontier. This breaches the general
UN-mandated blockade of Abkhazia’s Russian and Georgian frontiers, which is why
Abkhazia is sliding from being under recognised UN protection into a hybrid case that has
characteristics of association and integration – some would further say ‘creeping annexation’.
Russia avoids any formalisation of this process, and still makes vague diplomatic speeches
about supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity.
                                                
6 More precisely, most of the population of Abkhazia have in the course of the last year been able to register
their applications to obtain Russian citizenship with the Russian authorities. At this point the applicants have
only received a stamp in their old USSR passports, stating that their applications for Russian citizenship and
passports are being processed. It is understood that these procedures will be completed by the end of 2003. An
alternative, temporary solution might be for the UN to authorise the issue of international travel documents for
Abkhazians and South Ossetians for those who prefer (for the time being) to use neither Georgian nor Russian
passports. The UN in Kosovo issues such travel documents for Kosovars who do not want to travel on Yugoslav
passports, and a similar system exists for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, to whom Lebanon does not want to
grant Lebanese citizenship.MICHAEL EMERSON
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Attempts by the former UN special representative, Ambassador Boden, to gain agreement on
the principle of a federal solution failed to get beyond the stage of preliminary paperwork (see
Annex A). Abkhazia’s bottom line is to retain its independence from Tbilisi, relying on
Russian protection if necessary. Foreign minister Sergei Shamba is explicit about how they
would like to see Abkhazia fit into the international system. The objective in the short term is
a version of the Taiwan model, and in the long term, a version of the Marshall Islands model.
7
Taiwan has the protection of the US without international recognition, but retains partial
inclusion in international organisations such as the WTO. The Marshall Islands have self-
government in a free association with a major power (the US), which provides its currency,
defence and the possibility of dual-citizenship, as well as sponsors its international
recognition and membership in relevant international organisations. For Abkhazia, Russia
plays the role of the US, and Georgia plays the role of China.
For some time there has been discussion between the parties over a partial solution, allowing
the return of the Gali district to effective Georgian control, the return of many  IDPs, and
effectively redrawing the frontier between Georgia and Abkhazia northwards. In March 2003
there was a summit meeting between presidents Putin and Shevardnardze in Sochi, at which
that there was reportedly an agreement along these lines. In addition, the railway line would
be re-opened both ways, from Sukhumi north to Sochi (already achieved) and south-east to
Tbilisi. This would remove the blockades of Abkhazia on both sides. There would be
rehabilitation of the  Gali district and also of the  Inguri hydroelectric complex. The  Gali
district might be policed by a combined force of Abkhazians and Georgians, possibly with
Russians too. Georgia wanted agreement on federal principles for the final status of Abkhazia
within Georgia, but Russia refused any substantive negotiation on this point (and therefore the
status quo continues). The Sochi agreement has not yet been published. Irregardless, it has
resulted in the setting up of three tripartite (Abkhaz, Georgian and Russian) working parties
for economics, transport and refugees. The UN Geneva process used by the ‘Friends of
Georgia’ (France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) has also activated three working
parties, for economics, refugees and political issues. These two processes may yet come
together.
Nagorno Karabakh. This is a case of de facto irredentist secession and integration with
Armenia. Although the OSCE monitors the cease-fire line, Armenia’s protection has no
international status. Indicators of integration with Armenia include being part of the Armenian
currency area and customs union. Armenian citizenship and passports are generally available
to NK residents, most of whom are ethnically Armenian. Indeed, the President of Armenia is
the former President of Nagorno Karabkah.
The OSCE Minsk group negotiations have been lacking in transparency, especially recently.
The 1998 proposal for a common state of Azerbaijan and Nagorno  Karabakh (Annex B)
eventually found its way into the press. However the proposal died in the political turmoil
following the assassination of the Armenian prime minister in 1999 (however this tragedy is
believed not to have been related to these Nagorno Karabkah issues). At Key West in Florida,
in the spring of 2001, there was a US-mediated negotiation at summit level with Presidents
Aliev and Kocharian, following a summit in Paris. The Presidents returned home, allegedly
with the outline of an agreement, but its content has not yet been published. All that is clear is
                                                
7 For four decades after the Second World War, the Marshall Islands were a UN Trusteeship territory
administered by the US. In 1984 the Marshall Islands agreed a Compact of Free Association with the US, which
granted the islands autonomy, with the right to terminate the agreement (i.e. secede).CAUCASUS REVISITED
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that when President Aliev tested domestic political opinion on its content, he was forced to
retract the provisional agreement. The content seems to have included:
8
o  Return of part of the Azeri districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan, with
withdrawal of the NK armed forces. This would allow for the return of Azeri IDPs to
these lands.
o  A deal over land corridors for both Nagorno Karabakh and Nakichevan. The idea of either
or both land swaps and/or internationally guaranteed corridors seems to have been
discussed, with access through the Lachin corridor in favour of Armenia, in exchange for
a link through Megri to Nakhichevan in favour of Azerbaijan.
o  The Armenian borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey would be re-opened.
o  On the fundamental question of final status for Nagorno Karabakh, the publicly available
information (i.e. only press interpretations) has varied between two versions: either a
constitutional deal of a federative type – possibly a common state model where Nagorno
Karabakh remains in international law a part of the state of Azerbaijan, but with large
autonomy; or a categorical land swap, where Armenia retains Nagorno  Karabakh and
Azerbaijan is compensated by the gain of territory presently separating Nakichevan and
the rest of Azerbaijan.
In 2002, in view of the collapse of the Key West provisional deal, discussions resumed
between the two parties over a partial agreement, which bears some analogue with the partial
deal emerging over Abkhazia. Unofficial sources reported that some or most of the Azeri
districts currently occupied by  Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia to the south and east of
Nagorno Karabakh would be returned to Azerbaijan, and that the railway line along the Aras
river would be re-opened (going from Baku to Yerevan via Nakichevan). In addition, the
Turkish-Armenian frontier would be re-opened. Armenia is understood to have refused this
package.
9
Recently the new Turkish government sent out some signals in the direction of re-opening the
frontier with Armenia. A meeting of the two foreign ministers in early June 2003 seems to
have identified a possible short-term agenda for opening cross-border trade, before
establishing formal diplomatic relations and a complete opening of borders.
10
The blockading of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and of Abkhazia by Georgia and
Russia had presumably hoped to make these illegal secessions unsustainable, and to bring the
two secessionist entities to the negotiation table, if not to their knees. After a decade it is
evident that the use of the blockade as a weapon has had insufficient leverage to bring the two
entities to bargain away their de facto secessions.
Armenia is not actually blockaded at all, since the frontier with Georgia is open, and Georgian
commercial intermediaries are serving to arrange trade between Armenia and Turkey. The
‘source’ or ‘destination’ for Armenian trade becomes Georgia, with the aid of a little special
paperwork and a less than trivial commission charge.
                                                
8 Details have remained secret, which hardly helps informed political discussion and debate.
9 Details from official sources would be welcome.
10 See U. Ergan (2003), “Ankara and Yerevan trade signals”, Hurriyet newspaper, Ankara, 6 June. The journalist
goes on to report what he understands to be Ankara’s four conditions for establishing diplomatic relations and
for the borders to be completely open: 1) “Yerevan must give up its genocide claims. The issue has to be left to
the historians”; 2) “The article in the Armenian constitution concerning the territorial claims towards Turkey
must be removed”; 3) “Armenian forces must withdraw from the occupied territories of Karabakh”; and 4) “The
security corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan must be opened”.MICHAEL EMERSON
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Russia has given up compliance with the UN-mandated sanctions against Abkhazia, and
opened the railway between Sochi and Sukhumi in early 2003.
The closed borders do, however, impose a considerable economic cost through missed
opportunities for trade and the extra costs of transport. The World Bank studied these
questions in some detail.
11 The potential benefits of lifting the blockades are especially high
for Armenia, whose trade flows could more than double and lead to an increase of GDP by
30%. Nevertheless even for Azerbaijan, the costs it would incur to close its frontier with
Armenia are estimated to be a useful 5% of GDP. Some important trade flows are completely
cut off, notably the export of gas from Azerbaijan to Armenia (which it is getting instead from
Iran via a new pipeline), and of electricity from Armenia to Turkey. For Turkey, the
macroeconomic cost of foregoing trade with Armenia is not as large at the national level, yet
it is significant in hampering the economic development of its eastern regions.
Georgia exploits its monopoly to the maximum for the transit of Armenian trade. Anecdotal
evidence from traders reports that of the cost of sending a loaded truck from Yerevan to
Moscow, 80% of the total is incurred in crossing little Georgia.
12 A truck of 10-20 ton
capacity pays a transit fee of $245. Railway tariffs are not properly regulated and are riddled
with corruption.
South Ossetia. This small territory  is largely outside the effective jurisdiction of  Tiblisi.
Nevertheless it is not closed nor blockaded, nor is it annexed by Russia, nor unified with
North Ossetia. Peacekeeping is undertaken by joint patrols of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian
forces, mandated and monitored by the OSCE. South  Ossetia survives economically as a
smuggling enclave between Russia and Georgia, and the system is sustained with the aid of
considerable complicity between Georgian, Ossetian and Russian profiteers – a bizarre case of
corrupt autonomy with international protection. A year ago there was talk of Georgia
becoming able to re-establish customs procedures at the frontier point between Southern and
Northern  Ossetia (i.e. between Georgia and Russia), but this has not so far been
implemented.
13 This frontier is naturally easy to control because of the Caucasian mountain
geography, since it can be passed only through a single road tunnel. Smugglers or profiteers
have been able to pass that frontier without paying Georgian import duties or excise taxes.
The cheaper internal Russian price levels, especially for petrol, tobacco and alcohol, created
the illegal ‘duty-free shop’ foundations of the South  Ossetian economy. The open market
place on the southern frontier of South  Ossetia is conveniently located within a few
kilometres of Georgia’s principal east-west highway. The loss of revenues to the Georgian
budget must be considerable.
A principal criterion for assessing whether South Ossetia is in a state of de facto secession
from Georgia is therefore whether it is falling outside Tbilisi’s fiscal jurisdiction. If Georgia’s
fiscal jurisdiction fails to apply, South Ossetia becomes something of an illegal Caucasian
version of some European micro-states. The closest analogue in this respect is Andorra
14 – a
                                                
11 Evgeny Polyakov (2000), “Changing Trade Patterns after Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus”, World
Bank working paper.
12 B. Gultekin and N. Tavitian (2003), “Les Relations Armeno-Turques – La Porte Close de l’Orient”, working
paper, Groupe de recherches et d’information sur la paix et la securite (GRIP), Brussels.
13 Georgian police have check points on the frontier between South Ossetia and Georgia, but without levying
Georgian customs tariffs – to do so might be interpreted as recognising de facto South Ossetia’s secession.
14 Andorra and the other tax-haven micro-states of Europe are now, in fact, finding their situation to be under
increasing pressure from the European Union, in the context of its efforts to adopt harmonised taxation of
earnings from savings. The deal recently reached within the EU has been conditional on negotiations with
Andorra, Liechstenstein and Monaco for them to adopt tax measures to reduce their capacity to profit from theCAUCASUS REVISITED
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small entity occupying a mountain divide between two other states, living off tax-haven and
smuggling economics, and subject to a  condominion of the big neighbours to oversee it
(Georgia and Russia for Southern Ossetia, France and Spain for Andorra
15).
4.  What next?
Default scenario. This first case assumes that the external actors do not change their positions
fundamentally, and so between them devise no sufficient incentives, pressures or forceful
intervention to alter the status quo. This default scenario sees Abkhazia and  Nagorno
Karabakh as determined not to lose the essence of what they gained in war. To assure this,
they need continued protection from Georgian and Azeri threats to re-invade and re-establish
the authority of Tbilisi and Baku respectively. This protection is currently provided by Russia
for Abkhazia. It is initially supplied by Armenia for Nagorno Karabakh (with an implicit
Russian protection in the background), and by Russian bases near the Armenian frontier with
Turkey to balance Turkish support for Azerbaijan. As long as the protection is perceived to be
valid, the secessionist parties feel under no compelling need to negotiate something they do
not like. Russia continues to defer its withdrawal from some of the military bases, to which it
was committed by the OSCE summit of 1999.
16
If one listens to various political personalities in the Georgian and Azerbaijan parliaments,
one can have the impression that the default scenario leads to renewed war, with invasions of
Abkhazia by Georgia and/or of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan. This discourse is, needless
to say, considered by external observers to be both irresponsible and unrealistic in the
extreme. The would-be invaders do not seem to digest the fact that these two entities benefit
from at least implicit Russian security guarantees. Nor would the US nor the EU have any
sympathy for such attacks. It is now most unlikely that a ‘Europeanising’ Turkey would back
an Azeri attack. These speeches are made with a lot of emotion, but they are no more than a
tragically surrealist distraction from attending to the real needs of the people.
Simple, partial solutions. Recent developments point towards simple, partial solutions that do
not try to resolve questions of final status, but still seek to improve the quality of the status
quo. The details of this general option have already been described. There would be partial
territorial concessions by Abkhazia ( Gali district) and Armenia/Nagorno  Karabakh (Azeri
districts to the south and east of NK currently occupied by Armenian/NK forces). In both
cases significant numbers of IDPs would be able to leave their wretched refugee camps and
re-start normal lives. Additionally, in both cases there would be a re-opening of the
increasingly ineffective frontier blockades, with the railway lines re-opening from Sukhumi to
                                                                                                                                                        
displacement of EU savings. These three European micro-states are all, however, internationally recognised
sovereign states, members of the UN and the OSCE.
15 While this comparison is appealing, it should be added that Andorra is an independent sovereign state, with
two heads of state: the President of France and a Spanish bishop. Southern Ossetia might not be against
following this Andorran model further (why not the President of Georgia and a Russian bishop?). On the subject
of condominions, the UK has proposed a condominion solution to Spain for the Gibraltar problem, but the
people of Gibraltar rejected this in a referendum.
16 Negotiations between Russia and Georgia over the Akhalkalaki and Batumi bases were frozen in the autumn
of 2002 as a result of the Pankisi gorge crisis and Kodori incident, and only restarted in the past two months.
Russia is now asking between eight and ten years for its military personnel to be withdrawn, whereas Georgia
wants three years. As for the Gudauta base in Abkhazia, there is still disagreement on its final status. Russia
claims to have withdrawn most of the equipment, and this was verified by the OSCE and UN observers. The
base is still open as a recreational/logistical base for Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, and is guarded by about
100 Russian troops. Georgia therefore does not recognise that the base is closed in accordance with the Istanbul
OSCE commitment of 1999. (I am grateful to Oksana Antonenko of IISS, London, for this information.)MICHAEL EMERSON
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Tibilisi and from Baku to Yerevan via Nakichevan. Under this scenario, Turkey would also
re-open its frontier with Armenia. These partial solutions would bring humanitarian
advantages for some of the IDPs and economic gains from renewed trade or more efficient
trading regimes. There would be gains for both sides of these conflicts, without anyone
having made any concessions of principle on the final status questions.  It seems that Georgia
and Russia may have agreed to the Abkhazian element of this scenario, but this remains to be
confirmed and implemented. It seems that recent negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan on the Nagorno Karabakh element have become stalemated, with refusal this time
apparently coming from Armenia, whereas Azerbaijan was more amenable. However the new
Turkish government seems to be initiating an interesting dialogue with Armenia over possible
openings for bilateral trade, which might lead to activation of trilateral negotiations with
Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. The South Ossetian contribution to this scenario would
be to re-establish some Georgian fiscal jurisdiction on its northern frontier.
Complex, comprehensive solutions. These simple, partial solutions might prevail for a
number of years and new realities could begin to take root. The re-opening of frontiers could
create new bonds of common interest, raise economic welfare and foster a fresh political
environment in the region that would facilitate negotiations. On this basis more ambitious
schemes might gradually emerge. The agenda for regional cooperation between the three
states would become relevant again, perhaps starting with practical steps like transport and
energy linkages and then cooperation between law enforcement departments.
This interim phase could last about ten years, which sounds a long time, but is no more than
the recent period of frozen conflicts in the Caucasus (the Cyprus conflict was frozen for
almost thirty years). Then the ground could become more fertile for institutional
developments, since the costs of non-resolution of the final status issues are obvious. The
international financial institutions are still unable to help Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh,
because they are non-recognised entities. Also negotiations between the three states and the
substate entities are hampered by lack of legalisation of the latter’s status. In due course,
perhaps around the year 2015, the potential for regional cooperation may come to be seen as
sufficiently rich to justify and indeed require some institutional organisation.
This also would require that the final status of the secessionist entities be clarified. As a result
some quite complex or subtle solutions emerge, of the kind that have been seen in Europe. For
example, Nagorno Karabakh could use some features of the Aland Island model,
17 as an
autonomous ethnic Swedish province of Finland, protected by international guarantors, and
combine it with elements of the Northern Irish model.
18 Abkhazia has its own ideas, already
described above, to graduate from the Taiwan model to the Marshall Islands model. This
would lead to some kind of association with Russia and international recognition for
participation in relevant international organisations, but falls short of sovereign state
independence. Nonetheless it is wishful thinking of the  Abkazian leadership to dream of
international recognition as a free, associated state of Russia, unless they are ready to
negotiate a civilised resolution of the refugee issue for the whole of Abkhazia, (not just the
Gali district). This would in turn mean an agreed and ordered relationship with Georgia.
Without that, Abkhazia remains a semi-pariah entity, under-populated and depressed.
It would be total illusion to suppose that the Caucasus can jump straight into a thoroughly
Europeanised (or advanced Pacific) structure. Some of these compromise formulae might be
                                                
17 For a summary account of the Aland island model see M. Emerson (2002), The Wider Europe as the Europan
Union’s Friendly Monroe Doctrine, CEPS Policy Brief No. 27, Brussels, October.
18 See footnote 3 above.CAUCASUS REVISITED
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useful. But the main design has to respond to the problems of the weak Caucasian state. This
would indicate that:
o  On the one hand, the federative structures of the Caucasian states would have to be quite
simple and minimal. Therefore the ‘common state’ idea is suggested as something
between the usual federal and confederal models.
o  On the other hand, the role of the external guarantors would have to be very strong,
certainly in the first period of obtaining an agreement, and also for some years in
overseeing its implementation.
o  Overall, this amounts to a four-tier model (entity, common state, region and overarching
power) from the taxonomy presented above. It is worth noting that a model of this kind
was emerging already in the Balkans in the 1990s, albeit with the differences that the
Balkans are a somewhat bigger and more complex region, and see a more important EU
role than in the Caucasus.
Why not a Caucasian roadmap and quartet? The idea of a slow evolutionary process, by
stages over the next decade, might be considered realistic so as to allow for generational
change in the attitudes of the peoples of the Caucasus and their leaderships. It might also be
considered convenient for the EU, which shows little sign at present of wanting to promote
early  Europeanisation of the Caucasus, except in token ways. The EU’s priorities for the
foreseeable future are to digest its current enlargement and then the next ones that are
programmed to extend up to the Black Sea and Caucasus (with Bulgaria, Romania and
perhaps Turkey). By this time the Europeanisation of Russia itself will have matured further,
which in turn may facilitate cooperation over the South Caucasus as well as possibly the
execution of some solution to the Chechnya problem. This view of current EU attitudes today
is consistent with the Commission’s recent ‘Wider Europe’ Communication,
19 which sketched
new neighbourhood policies for the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Russia and the Western CIS
(Russia, Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine), yet explicitly excluded the Caucasus. This
exclusion may still not become EU policy, since the Council and European Parliament
sometimes take more activist and strategic lines than the Commission.
20
But this scenario of convenience for the EU and South Caucasus leaderships may not hold. In
any case there is a new wild card in the equation: the next steps in the post-Saddam agenda of
the US ‘democratic imperialists’ (to use the current terminology of Washington political
commentaries). The answer to this question, whatever it may be, is likely to come quite soon.
It will not wait ten years. US policy (post-Saddam) is moving on to Syria and Iran, right up to
the Caucasus. Today the Caucasus may not register prominently on the US’s strategic radar
screen. However the US already has established a military foothold in Georgia and surely has
the Pankisi gorge still under surveillance, given its past role as a haven for a mixed cocktail of
Chechnyan refugees, Islamic fundamentalist terrorists and drug traffickers. The US has gained
extraordinary access to Georgia for its military (freedom to move in and out with their
equipment without visa or even passport). The US may want to turn the heat up
diplomatically, for example, to obtain at least the simple, partial solutions described above.
This leads back to the fundamental foreign policy issues of the post-11 September 2001 and
now post-Saddam eras. As recently argued by Pierre  Hassner, the world now moves on
                                                
19 European Commission (2003), “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A Framework for Relations with our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours”, COM(2003)104 final, Brussels, 3 November.
20 These institutions are less preoccupied than the Commission by the burden of managing its existing
responsibilities, and therefore can be more open to new tasks.MICHAEL EMERSON
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towards the third round of the Iraq affair.
21 In the first round, the US/UK suffered a
spectacular defeat diplomatically, risking failure to get even a simple majority in the UNSC
had it gone to the vote, as France had successfully built an impressive anti-war coalition with
Germany, Russia, China and many other supporters. In the second round, the US/UK
achieved a spectacular military victory. The question now, is what happens in the third round.
Prime Minister Blair manifestly tries to re-build broken bridges, notably with Chancellor
Schroeder, Presidents Chirac and Putin. The French leadership of the anti-war coalition was
impressive as an act of opposition, but (as Pierre  Hassner argues) France cannot drive
constructive acts of foreign policy without unity within the EU and a working cooperation
with the US. Russia, for its part, is deeply resentful of US hegemonic unilateralism. The
experience of the diplomatic costs of the unilateral Iraq war may persuade more people in
Washington to tone down the aggressive unilateralism spoken out most clearly by Richard
Perle: “We don’t need allies”, and to return to broader coalition diplomacy in the third round.
In this context, the Caucasus becomes a relevant and interesting case. It does not register that
large on the threat perception radar screens. But it is still tangential to the Middle East and a
haven of illegality and poor governance. It is a conduit for the trafficking of drugs, and the
links between Islamic fundamentalist groups and Chechnyan insurgents have actually been
more substantively documented than those between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Al Qaida.
As for the next steps of US action in the Caucasus, one could imagine either of two
approaches. A first option would be ‘assertive bilateralism’, and would, for example, see an
increasing presence of the US military and CIA agents to curb disorders such as those in the
Pankisi gorge. The US would, in this scenario, also be playing up to Georgia’s expectations
for its NATO relationship and implicit protection, and at the same time fostering resentment
and old ‘great game’ hostilities in the Russian political discourse. A second option would be a
cooperative thrust of policy for conflict resolution and improvement of law and order,
undertaken together with the EU and Russia, and possibly using the OSCE framework more
seriously.
A desirable scenario would be to see the US to correct its ‘we don’t need allies’ policy and the
EU to correct its ‘do nothing much for ten years’ policy. Both parties would join with Russia
now to stabilise and impose order in the Caucasus. The substance of this policy has already
been sketched. The simple, partial solutions might be pushed through quickly by joint
agreement of the EU, Russia and the US. The final status talks might be brought forward to a
three to five year time horizon. These talks would define federative constitutional
arrangements, schemes for regional cooperation and the overarching international security
guarantees. The overall plan might strangely resemble what was called a ‘stability pact’ a few
years ago. But nobody seems to like that name any more. So let us call it a ‘roadmap’ instead.
Also the quartet of the perhaps renascent Middle East peace process – the EU, Russia, the US
and the UN – is a model of cooperation that could be easily transposed. For the Caucasus, the
EU might rationalise its representation in the UN and the OSCE mediation exercises, since it
is already in the process of nominating a new Special Representative for the region. The mix
of UN and OSCE roles in the Caucasus should itself be rationalised, with a structure that
lends itself towards consistent and synergetic regional solutions, rather than the segmented
ones as at present. While both organisations could do the job, on balance it might be
preferable to rationalise around the OSCE, which is more specialised in this region and less
stretched than the UN these days.
                                                
21 P. Hassner (2003), “Etats Unis-Iraq-Europe – Troisieme Round”, Le Monde, 26 avril.CAUCASUS REVISITED
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5.  Conclusions
Foreign policymakers interested in the Caucasus are presumably giving thought now to the
question of “what next?” for this region in the aftermath of the Iraq war, bearing in mind an
emerging US offensive against Iran and a continuing push by Washington to re-order the
wider Middle East. By comparison with Iraq or Iran, the unresolved conflicts of the Southern
Caucasus rank only in the second level of priorities, although they may be more easily
tractable.
The default scenario, in which the external powers take no united initiative to sort out the
region, is one of deepening entrenchment of the de facto secessions of Abkhazia, South
Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh, (the first two becoming virtually annexed by Russia and the
third by Armenia). The US and Russia would be implicitly carving up the region, with Russia
standing behind Armenia and the US increasing its support for Georgia and the strategic
Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline under construction, to be accompanied probably by a Baku-Ezrum
gas pipeline. The EU would be present only in token ways. The region’s internal politics and
economics would remain, as far as one can see, entangled in the most comprehensive
networks of corruption, leaving a few enriched and the population as a whole reduced to third
world living standards. Maybe this would be a more or less stable situation strategically, and
just a very poor outcome for the people. Actually, the scale of emigration is so high,
especially of the young and able, that this scenario may not be stable at all in the long run.
22
Some politicians of the region do talk of war, especially in Azerbaijan and to some extent in
Georgia too. But for the time being, this is no more than a bankrupt distraction from more
constructive political discourse.
There could be better futures for the region, but the people of the region themselves tend to
believe that this could only come if the external powers decided to intervene in a united and
determined manner. There is surely no quick recipe for de-corrupting the politics and
economics of the region, with or without the external powers. Nevertheless, sorting out the
unresolved conflicts and removing the semi-blockaded frontiers of the region is in principle
far more tractable – since simple, partial solutions have at least been identified and discussed.
By way of simple, partial solutions the key moves could be:
o  For Abkhazia, the southern Gali district would be returned to effective Georgian control
and more Georgian IDPs could return there under safe conditions; the railway line would
be re-opened both north and south; and there would be cooperation over electricity
supplies, etc. Peacekeeping arrangements would be restructured. Internationally
recognised travel documents might be arranged for Abkhazians (and South  Ossetians)
who do not want either Russian nor Georgian passports for the time being.
o  For South  Ossetia, Georgian fiscal jurisdiction over the frontier between Russia and
Georgia would be re-established (at the exit of the tunnel between North and South
Ossetia).
o  Concerning Nagorno Karabakh, the nearby Azeri districts to the south and east would be
returned to Azerbaijan, and land corridors would be internationally guaranteed to suit both
Armenia/Nagorno  Karabakh (Lachin) and Azerbaijan (the  Megri district linking with
Nakhichevan). The railway line from Baku to Yerevan via Nakhichevan would be re-
                                                
22 In May 2003 new Georgian census data was published, giving a population figure of 4.4 million, compared to
5.5 million in 1989 (Institute for War & Peace Reporting [info@iwpr.net]). There have also been reports of huge
declines in Armenia’s population.MICHAEL EMERSON
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opened, and this would link up with the rest of the Caucasus rail network in Georgia.
Turkey would re-open its border with Armenia.
Final status issues would be deferred, but the above are well-identified steps that have almost
been agreed in recent times. They would be obvious improvements to the status quo on both
humanitarian and economic policy grounds.
The fact that these initiatives have not yet been fully agreed nor implemented can be read in
different ways. A first hypothesis is that all that is needed is a really determined, united and
publicly transparent push by the external powers. A second hypothesis is that these simple,
partial measures cannot be disassociated from the final status issues, as Georgia and
Azerbaijan would surely argue, being the parties that have lost territory. This argument could
be met by adopting a staged process, analogous with the principles of the Middle East
Roadmap adopted by the quartet there, with interim and final stages. In fact, such a
proposition for the Caucasus looks far easier than for the Middle East, but the logic would be
the same. There would be a timetable, with final status conferences scheduled for several
years ahead, allowing for the Aliev and Shevarnadze successions. The issue then would be
whether the content of the final stage would be left entirely open beyond the rendezvous
clause, or whether there would be some substance on the nature of the constitutional
solutions. As examples from Europe cited above have shown, there are ways of achieving
multi-tier governance solutions for regions with complex divisions such as the Caucasus. The
Caucasian case is a natural candidate ultimately for a four-tier structure (substate entities,
federative states, regional structures and an overarching external or international role).
Perhaps the European Union ought to take a lead with ideas here, using the services of its
(proposed) special representative for the region. The EU itself cannot impose a solution. Yet it
has an ideology and a degree of impartiality that makes a mediating role conceivable – with
both the region’s leaders and the other external powers. President Putin looks for some new
Greater Europe initiative. The EU is developing a Wider Europe policy. The US wants to see
an ordering of the entire wider Middle East area. Russia and the US would have to agree that
they wanted to undertake a Caucasus initiative together. That is an open question.  Maybe
recent events (the simultaneous suicide bombings in Chechnya and Riyadh) could tip the
balance to re-establish the commonality of purpose created by the events of 11 September
2001, even after Iraq.
Looking beyond this immediate context, the underlying question is how the interested
external powers and multilateral organisations are (or are not) going to shape up as an
overarching tier of power and influence for stabilising regions of chronically weak and
conflictual states. The Caucasus, like the Balkans, has little history of independent statehood,
having been invariably subject to various imperial powers. For the Balkans it is clear that the
Europeanisation process is beginning to transform the region, as a plausible model of 21
st
century cosmopolitan democracy. For the Caucasus, however, the model needs further
refinement, and while questions regarding it remain open, this paper has hinted at some
answers.17
ANNEX A. GEORGIA: ‘BODEN COMPETENCES PAPER’
1.  Georgia is a sovereign State, based on the rule of law. The borders of the State of Georgia,
effective on 21 December 1991, may not be altered except in accordance with the
constitution of the State of Georgia.
2.  Abkhazia is a sovereign entity, based on the rule of law, within the State of Georgia.
Abkhazia enjoys a special status, within the State of Georgia, which is established by a
Federal Agreement, providing for broad powers and defining the spheres of common
competences and delegated powers, as well as guarantees for the rights and interests of the
multi-ethnic population of Abkhazia.
3.  The distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi shall be governed by a
Federal Agreement, which shall have the force of Constitutional Law. Abkhazia and the
State of Georgia shall abide by the provisions of the Federal Agreement in good faith.
They shall not amend or modify the Federal Agreement, nor terminate or invalidate it in
any ways, other than by mutual agreement.
4.  The distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi will be defined, inter alia,
on the basis of the Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-
Abkhaz conflict, signed on 4 April 1994. The rights and competences of Abkhazia will be
greater than those enjoyed prior to 1992.
5.  The Constitution of the State of Georgia shall be modified in light of the distribution of
competences specified by the Federal Agreement, for the elaboration of which the
Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, signed
on 4 April 1994, and in particular, paragraph 7 regarding quote powers for joint action
unquote, may serve as one point of reference.
6.  The Constitution of Abkhazia, for which the Constitution of Abkhazia adopted on 26
November 1994 may serve as a basis, shall be modified in light of the agreement on the
distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as determined by the Federal
Agreement.
7.  Both the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the Constitution of Abkhazia shall
include analogous provisions regarding the safeguard and protection of the fundamental
human rights and freedoms of all individuals, including the rights of national minorities,
without discrimination. Nothing in the Constitution of the State of Georgia and the
Constitution of Abkhazia shall infringe upon the unconditional right of all refugees and
displaced persons to return to their homes in secure conditions in accordance with
international law.
8.  The State of Georgia and Abkhazia shall agree on the composition and procedures of a
Constitutional Court, which shall rule on the basis of the constitution of the State of
Georgia, the Constitution of Abkhazia and the Federal Agreement on matters relevant to
the distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.
Source: Paper prepared by Ambassador Dieter  Boden, Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General in Georgia, 27 November 2001.18
ANNEX B. ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE
NAGORNO-KARABAKH ARMED CONFLICT
[Prepared under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, 7 November 1998]
Being determined to implement a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in
accordance with the norms and principles of international law including principles of
territorial integrity of states and self-determination of people, Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Nagorno-Karabakh agree on the following:
Agreement on the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh
The Parties shall conclude an Agreement on status of Nagorno-Karabakh which includes the
following provisions:
Nagorno-Karabakh is a statal and territorial entity in the form of a Republic, which constitutes
a common state with Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders.
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh shall sign an Agreement on delimitation of spheres of
competence and on reciprocal delegation of powers between their relevant authorities, which
shall have the force of a Constitutional Law.
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh shall establish a Joint Committee, which shall include
representatives of the presidents, prime-ministers, and chairmen of the parliaments, whose
mission shall be to define policies and activities within the sphere of joint competence.
In order to maintain contacts and effect coordination of joint actions, reciprocal
representations of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan shall be established in Baku and
Stepanakert respectively.
Nagorno-Karabakh shall have the right to establish direct external contacts with foreign states
and relevant regional and international organizations in the areas of economics, science,
culture, sports and humanitarian affairs through appropriate representations abroad. Political
parties and non-governmental organizations in Nagorno-Karabakh shall have the right to
establish links with political parties and non-governmental organizations of foreign states.
Nagorno-Karabakh shall participate in execution of the foreign policies of Azerbaijan, with
respect to the issues touching upon its interests. Decisions on such issues shall not be taken
without consent of the two Parties.
Where it has special interests, the government of Nagorno-Karabakh shall be entitled to have
its own representatives in the embassies and consular missions of Azerbaijan accredited in
foreign states. Nagorno-Karabakh may also include its experts in Azerbaijani delegations to
take part in international negotiations that impinge upon the interests of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The borders of Nagorno-Karabakh shall correspond to the borders of the former Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Should there be verification or alterations, these shall be the
subject of special mutual agreement between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The borders between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh shall be reciprocally open for free
movement by their unarmed citizens. Citizens traveling and conducting business across the
borders shall not be subject to customs fees and other tariffs. Their respective governments
shall have the competence to grant the right of permanent residence.
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh shall not use force or threaten to use force to settle
disputes.CAUCASUS REVISITED
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In the event of disputes or differences that cannot be resolved within the framework of the
Joint Committee, the Parties shall be entitled to seek a consultative opinion of the OSCE
Chairman-in-Office, which shall be taken into account in the final decision.
Nagorno-Karabakh shall also enjoy the rights and privileges, listed below, that shall be
formalized in the Agreement on the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh and endorsed by the Minsk
Conference.
1. Nagorno-Karabakh shall have its own constitution, adopted by the people of Nagorno-
Karabakh through a referendum. This Constitution shall incorporate the provisions of the
Agreement on the Status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan shall likewise amend its constitution to incorporate this Agreement. The
provisions of that Agreement, and those portions of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani
constitutions that incorporate them, shall not be changed without the consent of all three
parties.
2. The constitution and laws of Nagorno-Karabakh shall be in effect on the territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The laws, regulations and executive decisions of Azerbaijan shall be in
effect on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh if they do not contradict the constitution and laws
of the latter.
3. Nagorno-Karabakh shall have its own flag, seal and anthem.
4. Nagorno-Karabakh shall, pursuant to its Constitution, form its own legislative, executive
and judicial authorities.
5. Citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh shall bear as their identification documents Azerbaijani
passports carrying the special notation “Nagorno-Karabakh.” The government of Nagorno-
Karabakh or its authorized agencies shall have the exclusive right to issue such passports.
The citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh of Armenian descent may emigrate to Armenia and, in the
case of a permanent resettlement, they may take up Armenian citizenship in accordance with
laws of that country.
6. The people of Nagorno-Karabakh shall have the right to elect their representatives to the
Parliament of Azerbaijan and to participate in the election of the President of Azerbaijan.
7. Nagorno-Karabakh shall constitute a Free Economic Zone. It shall have the right to issue its
own currency notes, which will be in circulation along with Azerbaijani currency notes, as
well as the right to issue its own stamps.
8. Nagorno-Karabakh shall have the right to free and unrestricted transport and
communications access to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
9. Nagorno-Karabakh shall possess National Guard (security forces) and police forces formed
on a voluntary basis. These forces may not operate outside Nagorno-Karabakh without the
consent or special request of the government of Azerbaijan.
10. The army, security and police forces of Azerbaijan shall not have the right to enter the
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh except with the consent of the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.
11. The Armenian language shall be the primary official language in Nagorno-Karabakh. The
second official language shall be Azerbaijani. Each citizen shall enjoy the right to use his or
her native language in all official and non-official contexts.
12. The budget of Nagorno-Karabakh shall consist of receipts derived from its own resources.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Government shall encourage and guarantee investments byMICHAEL EMERSON
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Azerbaijanis and foreign companies and persons.
The question of utilization of the  Lachin Corridor by Nagorno-Karabakh, with a view to
ensuring unrestricted communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, shall be
agreed upon separately, provided Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh do not agree on other
arrangements concerning a special status of the  Lachin district. The  Lachin district shall
remain permanently a fully demilitarized zone.
Regarding the towns of Shusha and Shaumyan
The Parties agree that all Azerbaijani refugees may return to the places of their residence in
the town of  Shusha. Their security shall be guaranteed by the appropriate authorities of
Nagorno-Karabakh. They shall enjoy equal rights with all citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh,
including the right to form political parties, to participate in elections at all levels, to be
elected to all legislative bodies and organs of local self-governance, to enter military service
and to serve in law enforcement agencies.
The same rights shall be granted to Armenian refugees on their return to the town of
Shaumyan.
Citizens of the towns of  Shusha and  Shaumyan shall have unrestricted access by road,
telecommunications and other links with the rest of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan shall assist in the deployment and
activities of the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
missions.
The Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh shall be signed by the three Parties and
enter into force upon its endorsement by the Minsk Conference.
Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict
The Parties agree that the agreement on the cessation of the Armed Conflict shall include the
following provisions:
I.  The Parties renounce the threat or use of force to settle disputes among shall settle all
such disputes, including any that may arise in connection with the implementation of the
agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict by peaceful means, above all, through
direct negotiations or in the framework of the OSCE Minsk process.
II.  The Parties shall withdraw their armed forces in accordance with the following
provisions and as set forth in detail in Annex 1:
A. In the First Stage, forces along the current line of contact to the east and south of
Nagorno-Karabakh shall withdraw to lines delineated in Annex 1, and in accordance
with the schedule therein, with due consideration for the recommendations of the OSCE
High Level Planning Group (“HLPG”), to facilitate initial deployment of the vanguard of
an OSCE multinational force in a militarily sound transitional buffer zone, to separate
the Parties along that line and to provide security during the second stage of withdrawals.
B. In the Second Stage, forces shall withdraw simultaneously and in accordance with the
schedule set forth in Annex 1 as follows:
(1)  Any forces of Armenia located outside the frontiers of the Republic of Armenia shall
withdraw behind those frontiers.
(2)  The forces of Nagorno-Karabakh shall withdraw behind the 1988 boundaries of theCAUCASUS REVISITED
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Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (“NKAO”), with the exception of the
Lachin District, until achievement of an agreement on unrestricted communication
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
(3)  The forces of Azerbaijan shall withdraw behind lines delineated in Annex I on the
basis of the recommendations of the HLPG and shall withdraw from any territory of
Armenia.
(4)  Heavy armaments shall be withdrawn to positions specified in Annex 1, on the basis
of the recommendations of the HLPG. These withdrawals shall be monitored by the
OSCE peacekeeping force, with requirements for transparency and reporting as set
forth in that Annex.
III.  The territory subject to these withdrawals shall constitute a Buffer Zone and a Zone of
Separation, the details of which are set forth in Annex 2.
A. Upon completion of the withdrawal of forces, the Buffer Zone shall be located around
the 1988 boundaries of the NKAO. It may be also located along the northern and
southern boundaries of the Lachin District in the event of an appropriate agreement. The
Buffer Zone shall be completely demilitarized and unpopulated except for the presence
of elements of the OSCE Peace Keeping Operation (PKO).
B. The Zone of Separation shall be demilitarized with the exception of forces permitted
to operate for the PKO in cooperation with the Permanent Mixed Commission, as set
forth in detail in Annex 2, to include:
(1)  elements of the PKO
(2)  Azerbaijani units for border patrolling and de-mining; and
(3)  civilian police whose numbers and permitted weaponry are delimited by Annex 2.
C. A no-fly zone shall be established in the Buffer Zone and the Zone of Separation in
which the Parties shall exclude military flights, with monitoring by the OSCE
peacekeeping force as set forth in Annex 2.
D. After withdrawal of forces in accordance with Article II, security in all the regions
which remain under the control of Nagorno-Karabakh shall be maintained by relevant
security forces of Nagorno-Karabakh.
IV.  Pursuant to OSCE’s decisions at the 1994 Budapest Summit, the Parties shall invite and
facilitate deployment of the OSCE multinational peacekeeping operation (“PKO”) which
will act in cooperation with the Permanent Mixed Commission (PMC) and the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Intergovernmental Commission (AAIC). The PKO shall monitor
the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons, the exclusion of military flights, the
maintenance of the demilitarization regime and the situation along the Armenian-
Azerbaijani frontier, as set forth in Annex 2. The peacekeeping operation shall be
established pursuant to an appropriate UN Security Council Resolution for an initial
period of no more than one year, renewable as necessary upon recommendation of the
OSCE Chairman-in-Office. The Parties agree that overall duration of the PKO shall be
kept to the minimum period necessary in light of the situation in the region and the pace
of the comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the
PKO to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, and to prevent any breach in or
interruption of the peacekeeping operation.
V.  The Parties shall facilitate the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to theirMICHAEL EMERSON
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former places of residence within the Zone of Separation, as set forth in Annex 2. The
PKF, in cooperation with the Permanent Mixed Commission, will monitor the security of
the returnees and promote confidence of all the Parties in the observance of the
demilitarization regime in this zone. The Parties shall conduct negotiations to achieve the
earliest safe and voluntary return of all other persons not covered by this Agreement or
the comprehensive settlement who were displaced by the conflict and by tensions
between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1987.
VI.  Simultaneously with the withdrawal of forces, the Parties shall undertake immediate
measures to open roads, railroads, power, communications, trade and other links,
including all work necessary to accomplish this in the shortest possible period, according
to the schedule and detailed provisions set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall ensure
unrestricted use of these links to all, including unrestricted access by specific
communities to corresponding communities elsewhere in the region. Each Party commits
itself to lift all blockades and ensure delivery of goods and people to. the other Parties
without hindrance. The Parties shall ensure free and safe rail communication to one
another.
VII. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the ICRC, UNHCR and other international
institutions to ensure (1) prompt and safe return of all persons detained in connection
with the conflict, (2) investigation of the fate of those missing in action, (3) repatriation
of all remains and (4) unimpeded delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction aid
through territories under their control to the regions that have suffered during the
conflict. The Parties shall cooperate with the OSCE PKF through the Permanent Mixed
Commission to establish confidence-building measures.
VIII. The Parties shall immediately establish a Permanent Mixed Commission (“PMC”) to
supervise the implementation of the provisions of this Agreement with regard to issues
affecting Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Chairman of the PMC shall be a
representative designated by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. The Vice Chairmen of the
PMC shall be representatives of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The primary
responsibility of the PMC shall be to supervise implementation of the Agreement. The
responsibilities of the OSCE Chairman shall also include mediation of cases of
disagreement and authorization of responses to emergencies such as natural disasters.
The PMC shall have Military, Economic, Humanitarian and Cultural, and Liaison
Subcommissions. The structure, duties and other details concerning the PMC are set
forth in Annex 4.
IX.  The Parties shall immediately establish an Armenian-Azerbaijani Intergovernmental
Commission (“AAIC”) to assist in the prevention of border incidents between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, to conduct liaison between border-guard troops and other relevant
security forces of both countries, and to observe and facilitate arrangements for opening
roads, railroads, trade, communications, pipelines and other links. The AAIC shall have
two Co-Chairs, one from Armenia and one from Azerbaijan. The Commission shall also
include a representative designated by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. The structure,
duties and other details concerning AAIC are set forth in Annex 5.
X.  The Azerbaijan Republic and the Republic of Armenia shall engage in negotiations,
bilaterally and multilaterally in appropriate international and regional fora, to ensure the
larger security of the region, including military transparency and full compliance with
the CFE Treaty.
XI.  Each Party shall fully respect the security of the other Parties and their populations;CAUCASUS REVISITED
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undertake to promote good-neighborly relations among their peoples, facilitating trade
and normal interaction among them; and refrain from statements or actions that could
undermine this Agreement or good relations.
XII. In addition to the specific provisions concerning peacekeeping and monitoring’ of
withdrawals set forth above, and recalling the relevant principles and commitments of
the OSCE, including those reflected in the Helsinki Document of 1992 and the Budapest
Document of 1994, the OSCE, through appropriate mechanisms, shall monitor the full
implementation of all aspects of the present Agreement and take appropriate steps, in
accordance with those principles and decisions, to prevent and respond to violations of
the terms of this Agreement.
XIII. The Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed conflict shall be signed by the three
Parties and shall enter into force upon its endorsement by the Minsk Conference and
ratification by Parliaments of the three Parties.
XIV.  The Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia shall establish full diplomatic
relations, with permanent diplomatic missions headed by ambassadors, following
signature of the agreements and their endorsement by the Minsk Conference.
On Guarantees
1. The Parties shall take upon themselves mutual commitments to ensure compliance with the
aforementioned Agreements, including guarantees of the security of Nagorno-Karabakh, its
population and those refugees and displaced persons returning to the places of their former
residence.
2. The UN Security council shall monitor implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement.
3. The Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Agreement on the Cessation of
the Armed Conflict may be signed by the Minsk Conference Co-Chairs as witnesses. The
Presidents of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America affirm the
intention of the three countries to work in unison to monitor closely the progress of
implementation of the Agreements and to take appropriate measures to promote compliance
with this Agreement. The OSCE and the UN Security Council shall adopt appropriate
diplomatic, economic or, in extreme cases, military measures in accordance with the UN
Charter, should the need arise.ABOUT CEPS 
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